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SEPARATION OF POWERS, LEGISLATIVE
VETOES, AND THE PUBLIC LANDS
EUGENE

R.

GAETKE*

The Supreme Court's decision in Immigration and Naturalization

Service v. Chadha' struck a serious, if not fatal, blow to the constitutional acceptability of the legislative veto. 2 In Chadha the Court held
that a provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act,3 which
permitted one House of Congress to reverse a decision by the Attorney
General not to deport an alien,4 was a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers since it did not comply with the requirements of passage by both Houses of Congress and presentment to the President. 5
In light of that decision, the constitutionality of nearly 200 statutes6
utilizing some form of the legislative veto7 is questionable.
The effect this decision may have on the balance of powers between Congress and the executive branch is of obvious significance.'
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A., 1971, J.D., 1974, University of Minnesota.
1. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). The case is discussed further in the text infra accompanying notes 1332.
2. A "legislative veto" is a statutory device whereby Congress, through action other than traditional legislation, may disapprove of certain action taken by the Executive Branch. The concept has
been implemented in a number of different ways. Typically, the statutes utilizing legislative vetoes
require certain administrative agency actions to be placed before both Houses of Congress or before
certain committees within Congress. The agency action does not become effective until a specified time
has passed. During this period the proposed action may be disapproved by one or both Houses of
Congress or, in some cases, by a specified committee within Congress.
For further discussion of the variations of the legislative veto as utilized by Congress, see Breyer,
The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 73 GEO. L.J. 785, 785-86 (1984); DeConcini & Faucher, The Legislative Veto: A ConstitutionalAmendment, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 29, 30-34 (1984); Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of CongressionalPower, 68 VA. L. REV. 253, 256-57 n.9 (1982).
For an excellent historical discussion of the legislative veto, see Watson, CongressSteps Out: A Look at
CongressionalControl of the Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 983, 991-1029 (1975).
3. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1982).
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982). For the text of the statutory provision under review in Chadha,
see infra note 14.
5. 103 S. Ct. at 2787.
6. Id. at 2788 (Powell, J., concurring), 2792 (White, J., dissenting).
7. Such statutes vary considerably as to the procedure for congressional review of agency actions
and as to the congressional action necessary to reverse those actions. For authorities discussing these
variations, see supra note 2.
8. The legislative veto has prompted considerable scholarly comment, both before and after the
Court's decision in Chadha. Pre-Chadhadiscussions of the issue are listed at 103 S. Ct. at 2797 n. 12
(White, J., dissenting). Post-Chadha discussions of the Court's decision are listed in Glicksman, Severability and the Realignment of the Balance of Power Over the Public Lands: The FederalLand Policy
and Management Act of 1976 After the Legislative Veto Decisions, 36 HASTINGs L.J. 1, 20 n. 133 (1984).
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For those interested in the power of Congress over the public lands,
the implications of the Chadha decision are of particular importance.
Under that portion of article IV of the Constitution known as the
property clause, Congress is given the power "to dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting" the public lands.9
Utilizing this authority, Congress has frequently reserved the power to
review and reject decisions made by agencies delegated the authority
to manage the public lands. These reservations of power are often
stated in the terms of a legislative veto.10 That device has thus become
a prominent feature of public lands legislation." If the Court's deci9. U.S. CONST. art.IV, § 3, cl. 2.
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this
Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any
particular State.
Besides its article IV powers, Congress has additional powers over a limited category of federal
lands under article I. For a discussion of these powers, see Gaetke, Refuting the "Classic" Property
Clause Theory, 63 N.C.L. REV. 617, 619 n.5 (1985); Gaetke, Congressional Discretion Under the Property Clause, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 381, 381 n.2 (1981). This Article, however, is limited to a discussion of
Congress' powers under the property clause of article IV.
10. Numerous public lands statutes contain some form of legislative veto. See, e.g., Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1982) (the Secretary of Interior has power to grant oil
and gas leases to certain submerged lands and to determine the bidding system under which such leases
are to be awarded. The bidding systems, however, must be submitted by the Secretary to both Houses
of Congress and become effective only if neither House passes a resolution of disapproval within 30
days); 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(l),(a)(4)(A) (1982); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 43 U.S.C. §§ 13531354 (1982) (exports of oil and gas in possession of federal government are subject to concurrent resolution of disapproval by Congress); the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 15711599 (1982) (Congress retained power to veto modifications of project proposed by Secretary of Interior), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1574, 1598(a) (1982); The Act in Implementation of Alaska Native Claims Settlement and Alaska Statehood, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1982) (no additional congressional review
provided but an exception to certain treatment of withdrawals under the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1783 (1982) is included, where those withdrawals were approved
by concurrent resolution of Congress).
11. The first use of the legislative veto concept may have been in the Northwest Ordinance of
1787, a public lands statute under the Confederation, 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
334-43 (1787), re-enacted during the First Congress under the Constitution. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch.
VIII, § 1, I Stat. 50-51 (1789). That statute provided for congressional review of all laws of territories
carved out of the public lands. See 103 S. Ct. at 2800-01 n.18 (White, J., dissenting). Contra Watson,
supra note 2, at 994-95 n.37.
The most notable utilization of the legislative veto device in public land law is the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1783 (1982). This statute reasserted congressional control over the sale of federal lands and their withdrawal from the operation of other public
lands legislation. Under the act, numerous actions taken by the Secretary of the Interior pertaining to
the public lands are subject to congressional reversal by concurrent resolution. See 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1712(e), 1713(c), 1714(c)(1), 1714(l)(1), 1722(b) (1982). For a thorough discussion of the act and its
legislative veto provisions, see Glicksman, supra note 8, at 6-16, 33-45.
Furthermore, under the act, if the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of either House of
Congress determines and notifies the Secretary that an emergency exists relative to certain federal lands
and that "extraordinary measures must be taken to preserve values that would otherwise be lost", the
Secretary must withdraw the lands in question. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1982). By this provision, some-
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sion in Chadha renders unconstitutional such reservations of power
under the property clause, considerable statutory revision will be necessary to preserve congressional control over public lands

management.2
This Article explores the question of whether legislative vetoes
enacted under the article IV property clause power of Congress are

subject to the same objections made by the Court to the legislation
reviewed in Chadha. In Part I, this Article will briefly examine the
Chadha decision and the Court's objections to the legislation involved
in that case. Part II of the Article looks at case law that supports an
argument that legislative veto provisions found in property clause legislation are not subject to the objections made by the Court in Chadha.
In Part III, the Article measures the use of legislative vetoes in the

property clause context against the purposes underlying the doctrine
of separation of powers and concludes that such legislative vetoes may
well be constitutional under Chadha. Finally, in Part IV, this Articlk
suggests a limitation on that conclusion necessitated by the breadth of
the property clause power.
13
I. THE COURT'S DECISION IN CHADHA

The legislative provision under review in Chadha"4 required the
what different than the typical legislative veto which merely overturns an executive decision or action,
Congress retains the power, exercisable by mere majority vote of a committee of one House of Congress, to order the Secretary to take affirmative action. Id. For further discussion of this provision and
litigation under it, see infra note 82.
12. Such congressional control is particularly threatened by the Court's treatment of the severability issue in Chadha. The Court concluded that the unconstitutional legislative veto provision in the
Immigration and Nationality Act was severable from the rest of the statute, including the very section
in which the provision was found. 103 S. Ct. at 2774-76. The Court's decision on the issue of severability thus grants to the Attorney General a discretionary power to suspend deportations, unhampered by
the power of review retained by Congress. The implicit overruling of numerous legislative veto provisions by Chadha, when coupled with the Court's decision on the issue of severability, therefore, may
cause a significant realignment of power between Congress and the Executive Branch. For further
discussion of this issue, see Glicksman, supra note 8, at 65-90; Note, Severability of Legislative Veto
Provisions: A Policy Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1182 (1984).
13. This Article is concerned only with the Court's conclusions regarding the constitutionality of
legislative veto provisions. Other issues raised by the decision, and not addressed in this Article, are the
severability of unconstitutional veto provisions, 103 S. Ct. at 2774-76, see discussion supra note 12; and
the applicability of the political question doctrine, 103 S. Ct. at 2778-80.
14. The statute provided that:
[I]f during the session of the Congress at which a case is reported, or prior to the close of the
session of the Congress next following the session at which a case is reported, either the Senate
or the House of Representativespasses a resolution statingin substance that it does notfavor the
suspension of such deportation, the Attorney Generalshall thereupon deport such alien or authorize the alien's voluntary departure at his own expense under the order of deportation in
the manner provided by law. If, within the time above specified, neither the Senate nor the
House of Representatives shall pass such a resolution, the Attorney General shall cancel deportation proceedings.
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Attorney General to submit to both Houses of Congress executive decisions not to deport aliens found to be deportable under the immigration laws."5 By that provision Congress reserved the power to
disapprove of such decisions by resolution of either House and,
thereby, cause the deportation of the alien involved. 1 6 Under the legislation, the congressional veto of the attorney general's action required
neither the majority action of both Houses nor presentment of the resolution for possible presidential veto. 7
The Court 8 found the legislative veto provision under review to
be a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. 9 It perceived
congressional action under the provision to be an exercise of congressional "legislative powers" 2 necessitating compliance with the article
I procedural requirements of bicameralism and presentment to the
President.2" The majority opinion, however, also expressly recognized
that not all congressional action requires such bicameral passage and
presentment.22 According to the majority in Chadha, the critical
8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
15. Chadha had overstayed his nonimmigrant student visa. Conceding that he was deportable
under the Immigration and Naturalization Act, he applied for suspension of deportation under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254(a)(1) (1982), which grants the Attorney General discretion to suspend deportable aliens under
certain specified circumstances. The immigration judge granted Chadha's application, ordered his deportation to be suspended, and transmitted a report of the suspension to Congress pursuant to the
statute. 103 S. Ct. at 2770.
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982).
17. See supra note 14.
18. Chief Justice Burger delivered the majority opinion, 103 S.Ct. at 2769, joined by six members
of the Court. Justice Powell concurred in the result, 103 S.Ct. at 2788, contending that the legislative
veto provision constituted judicial action which was beyond the powers of Congress. Id. at 2791-92.
Justice White dissented, 103 S.Ct. at 2792, emphasizing that the proper approach to the constitutional
question should be to determine whether the legislative veto provision under review complies with the
purposes of the presentment and bicameralism requirements. Id. at 2798 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also dissented, in an opinion joined by Justice White, but limited his objections to the
majority's treatment of the issue of severability. Id. at 2816-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
19. 103 S.Ct. at 2787.
20. Id. at 2784-87.
21. Id. at 2787. Those procedural requirements are found in U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 7, cl.2, 3.
22. 103 S.Ct. at 2784. The opinion notes four express and unambiguous exceptions to the Article
I requirements of bicameralism and presentment: the House of Representatives' power to initiate impeachments (U.S. CONST. art.I, § 2, cl.
6), the Senate's power to try impeachments (U.S. CONST. art.I,
§ 3, cl.5), the Senate's power to approve and disapprove presidential appointments (U.S. CONST. art.If,
§ 2, cl.2), and the Senate's power to ratify treaties (U.S. CONST. art.II, § 2, cl.2). 103 S.Ct. at 2786.
Regarding these exceptions, the majority further notes that "when the Framers intended to authorize
either House of Congress to act alone and outside of its prescribed bicameral legislative role, they
narrowly and precisely defined the procedure for such action." 103 S.Ct. 2786-87 & n.20. The Court's
discussion of these express exceptions might be read as an implicit denial that other exceptions exist to
the article I requirements of bicameral passage and presentment to the President. However, the majority also makes reference to an implicit exception to the presentment requirement of article I.Id. That
implicit exception is the congressional power to propose amendments to the Constitution found in
article V. Although article V describes the size of the majority necessary to propose such an amend-
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question is whether the congressional action under review is, "in law
and fact, an exercise of legislative power."23
Some guidance for determining whether a congressional action is
"legislative" for purposes of article I's procedural requirements is provided by the opinion. First, the Court presumed that any action taken
by Congress is legislative in character because that is the power delegated to that branch by the Constitution.2 4 The Court then looked to
the purpose and effect of the congressional action accomplished by the
exercise of the legislative veto.25 In this regard, the Court emphasized
that the House's action in Chadha altered the "legal rights and duties
of persons, including the Attorney General, executive branch officials
and Chadha, all outside the legislative branch," which reflected the
action's legislative nature.26 The Court further noted that the legislative veto in Chadha effectively constituted an amendment of the immigration statute by requiring the Attorney General to take an action
which was discretionary under that statute.2 7 Finally, the Court emphasized that since a delegation of discretion to the Attorney General
is a legislative policy decision which could only be accomplished by
compliance with article I's procedural requirements, congressional alterations of or restrictions upon that delegation are also legislative policy decisions requiring such compliance.28
It is apparent from the Court's opinion that the focus of an inquiry regarding the application of Chadha to any other legislative veto
provision must be on whether the character and effect of the action
encompassed by the veto is legislative in nature.2 9 The breadth of this
approach has caused many to express concern about the constitutional
ment, it is silent as to the need for presentment to the President. Id. In Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798) the Court held that this type of action was not subject to the requirement of
presentment. It is not entirely clear, therefore, that the majority in Chadha was only addressing the
four express exceptions to the article I requirements when it declared that not all congressional actions
are subject to those requirements.
23. 103 S. Ct. at 2784 (emphasis added).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2785.
28. Id. at 2786.
29. "Whether actions taken by either House are, in law and fact, an exercise of legislative power
depends not on their form but upon 'whether they contain matter which is properly to be regarded as
legislative in its character and effect.' " 103 S. Ct. at 2784 (citing S. REP. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d
Sess. 8 (1897)). The Court also notes:
Since it is clear that the action by the House under § 244(c)(2) was not within any of the
express constitutional exceptions authorizing one House to act alone, and equally clear that it
was an exercise of legislative power, that action was subject to the standards prescribed in
Article I.
103 S. Ct. at 2787 (emphasis added).
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validity of the legislative veto device in any context.3 °
The Court in Chadha, however, expressly addressed only the constitutionality of a legislative veto provision contained in article I legislation."1 Whether legislative vetoes in the article IV property clause
context would fail under Chadha, therefore, would seem to be a question left open by the decision.32 If such congressional actions are less
"legislative" than the action reviewed in Chadha, there may well be
reason to uphold legislative vetoes in statutes providing for management of the public lands.

II. THE CASE LAW IMPLICATING DIFFERENT TREATMENT
. Certain rather aged Supreme Court case law suggests
that the requirement of bicameralism and presentment may not be applicable to
all non-article I actions by Congress. This case law may provide a
basis for distinguishing legislative vetoes found in property clause enactments from the provision held unconstitutional in Chadha.
The Supreme Court addressed the presentment requirement in a
non-article I context before the end of the eighteenth century. In the
1798 decision of Hollingsworth v. Virginia,33 a challenge was raised to
the application of the eleventh amendment 34 to suits pending at the
time of its adoption.3 5 One objection to the amendment, procedural in

nature, was that is was not presented to the President for possible veto
after its proposal by the Congress under article V. 36 The Court rejected this contention in a cryptic fashion, with Justice Chase stating
that the President's veto power applied only to "ordinary cases of legislation."'3 7 The President, Justice Chase declared, "has nothing to do
30. 103 S. Ct. at 2788 (Powell, J., concurring). Id. at 2792-93, 2796 (White, J., dissenting). Brubaker, Slouching Toward Constitutional Duty: The Legislative Veto and the Delegation of Authority, I
CONST. COMMENTARY 81, 82 (1984); DeConcini & Faucher, supra note 2, at 29; deSeife, Legislative
Delegation of Powers: A Hobson's Choice? 17 J. MAR. 279 (1984).
Other commentators have noted that the legislative veto provision overturned in Chadha was atypical of legislative veto provisions in general and was particularly vulnerable to constitutional challenge.
See Martin, supra note 2, at 261 n.22.
31. The legislation reviewed in Chadha was an exercise of congressional power over the subject of
naturalization. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4.
32. See supra note 22.
33. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). For further discussion of Hollingsworth, see Watson, supra note 2,
at 993.
34. That amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign States.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
35. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 379, 381.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 382.
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Hollingsworth, unfortunately, does not elucidate further what was
meant by "ordinary legislation" for purposes of the presentment requirement. Certainly proposed constitutional amendments, passed by
two-thirds majorities of both Houses of Congress under article V, were
not viewed as such legislation.
Other powers of Congress, however, may also be so categorized.
For example, the Senate is given the power to try impeachments and
to convict upon a two-thirds majority vote.3 9 The Senate is given the
further power to approve treaties, 4° and certain presidential appointments. 4 The House of Representatives is given the power to impeach.4 2 Presumably, each of these congressional actions are other
than "ordinary legislation" and, therefore, require no presentment to
the President before becoming effective. Indeed, these congressional
actions appear not to be "legislation" at all. The power of the House
of Representatives to impeach is prosecutorial, and hence, executive in
nature. The senatorial power to try impeachment is clearly judicial in
appearance. Only the non-article I senatorial power of approval over
treaties and certain presidential appointments resembles the "ordinary" work of legislatures, and even it is quite dissimilar to the enactment of statutory law.4 3
Congressional actions under the property clause, however, are
not so easily classified as extraordinary. To be sure, like the power to
propose constitutional amendments reviewed in Hollingsworth, the
property clause power is provided outside of article I, at least suggesting that exercise of the power would not be "ordinary legislation."
There is in the property clause, however, no express procedural peculiarity, such as unicameral action or exceptional majorities, to indicate
that enactments under it are in any way exceptional. Further, the
property clause power of Congress has been traditionally implemented
precisely by "ordinary legislation"; that is, by bicameral passage and
presentment to the President. To the extent that property clause actions might be considered to be exempt from the broad sweep of the
Chadha holdings, therefore, the reasons for that exemption must arise
out of some peculiar characteristics of property clause enactments.
38. Id.
39. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 5.
40. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
41.

U.S. CONS'r. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 6.
43. See Breyer, supra note 2, at 790.

566

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

The case law regarding separation of powers and the property clause
may well provide evidence of such characteristics.
In United States v. Midwest Oil Co.,' the Supreme Court addressed the issue of separation of powers in the public lands context.
The precise issue before the Court in Midwest Oil was not the legislative veto. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's approach to the separation of powers issue under article IV may well be instructive as to the
potential application of Chadha to legislative vetoes in property clause
legislation.
In Midwest Oil the Court was called upon to review the constitutionality of certain presidential action regarding the public lands. By
statute, Congress had previously declared all public lands containing
oil to be open to public exploration and purchase.4" The resulting development and depletion of oil reserves caused the Secretary of Interior to recommend to the President that certain of the public lands be
withdrawn4 6 from such entry until such time as corrective legislation
could be enacted by Congress in order to ensure adequate supplies of
oil for governmental needs.4 7 The President followed the Secretary's
recommendation and proclaimed the lands temporarily withdrawn "in
aid of proposed legislation." 4 Subsequently, developers entered a portion of the withdrawn lands, discovered oil and assigned their interests
to others who began production.4 9 The United States sought recovery
of the land and an accounting for the oil extracted in violation of the
proclamation. 0
The developers argued that the presidential proclamation was
44. 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
45. Act of February 11, 1897, c. 216, 29 Stat. 526, amended by 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1982).
46. "Withdrawal" is a term of art within the field of public lands law. The term typically means
that the Executive Branch has taken some action, frequently without any statutory authority, to remove
certain public lands from the operation of duly enacted legislation clearly applicable to such lands. See
G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW, 197-99 (1981).
47. 236 U.S. at 466-67.
48. Id. at 467. In fact, the proclamation declared that the withdrawal was in "aid of proposed
legislation" and only "temporary" in duration. Id. In the public lands context, however, such declarations have quite elastic meanings. For example, a withdrawal was deemed to be "in aid of proposed
legislation" and, therefore, appropriate even though it conflicted directly with a nearly contemporaneous statute in United States v. Consolidated Mines & Smelting Co., 455 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1971).
Similarly a withdrawal in aid of proposed legislation was deemed "temporary" even though it had
existed for 36 years in Mecham v. Udall, 369 F.2d 1, 4 (10th Cir. 1966). The Court in Midwest Oil
expressly notes that most temporary withdrawals in aid of proposed legislation never result in such
legislation. 236 U.S. at 479. Nevertheless, the withdrawals remain effective in precluding the acquisition of private rights in the lands withdrawn until the withdrawal order is revoked by the issuing official
or overturned by subsequent legislation. Id. at 476-78. For further discussion of the Midwest Oil withdrawal and its history after the Supreme Court decision, see Getches, Managingthe Public Lands: The
Authority of the Executive to Withdraw Lands, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 279, at 290-92 (1982).
49. 236 U.S. at 467.
50. Id. at 467-68.
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"absolutely void since it appears on its face to be a mere attempt to
suspend a statute-supposed to be unwise."5 Thus, Midwest Oil

presented the Court with the question of the constitutionality of a
presidential proclamation prohibiting the private acquisition of title to
certain public lands which Congress, using its property clause power,
had statutorily declared open to such acquisition.5 2 Despite article

IV's clear designation of Congress as the branch responsible for the
disposal and management of the public lands, the Court upheld the
presidential withdrawal of the lands from the operation of the
statute.53
In reaching its conclusion, the Court emphasized the long history
of similar executive withdrawals and the absence of any objection to
the practice by Congress. 54 The Court noted that such long-standing
congressional acquiescence regarding an executive action typically creates a presumption of the validity of the action. 55 In matters pertaining to the public lands the Court perceived this presumption to be
particularly strong. 6
The Court based this perception upon the peculiar character of
public lands legislation. Such statutes, the Court emphasized, "are not
of a legislative character in the highest sense of the term . . . 'but
savor somewhat of mere rules prescribed by an owner of property for

its disposal.' "" In regard to the public lands, the Court noted that
Congress may act as might a proprietor of private property.5 8 Just as
51. Id. at 469.
52. In some respects Midwest Oil thus presents the converse of the separation of powers issue
reviewed in Chadha. In Chadha, the issue was the validity of a mechanism (the legislative veto) which
effectuated a congressional determination that certain executive action was unwise. In Midwest Oil, on
the other hand, the issue was the validity of a mechanism (the executive withdrawal in aid of legislation) which effectuated a presidential determination that the application of a congressional enactment
was unwise. Justice Day in dissent in Midwest Oil stated that the lands at issue "were withdrawn solely
upon the suggestion that a better disposition of them could be made than was found in the existing acts
of Congress controlling the subject." 236 U.S. at 488 (Day, J., dissenting).
53. 236 U.S. at 483.
54. Id. at 469-72, 477-81. The Court relied upon a report of the Commissioner of the Land
Office, dated February 28, 1902, which showed that prior to 1910 there had been at least 252 Executive
Orders, all of which were made without express statutory authority, withdrawing public lands from the
operation of general public lands legislation. Id. at 469-71. The practice dated back to at least 1850.
Dubuque & Pac. R.R. v. Litchfield, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 66 (1859) (discussed in Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at
476-77). See also Grisar v. McDowell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 363, 371 (1867) (presidential withdrawal dated
November 5, 1850). Some of the early history of withdrawals in aid of legislation is presented by the
Court in Midwest Oil. See 236 U.S. at 476-81.
55. 236 U.S. at 473-74. For a discussion of Midwest Oil as the "seminal" case in determining the
role of custom in separation of powers issues in general, see Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving
Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U.L. REv. 109, 115-16 (1984).
56. 236 U.S. at 474-75.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 474-75. The Court noted that under the property clause, "Congress not only has a

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

a private proprietor might authorize an agent to act on its behalf and
define the agent's power relative to the property, Congress, as principal, may impliedly authorize its agent, the President, to act in a particular manner relative to the public lands.59 This authorization may be
express or implied and may be upheld even if it is contrary to express
directions that were previously given to the President in the form of
duly enacted legislation.6 °
The Court's analogy of Congress's power to the power of a private proprietor in Midwest Oil thus defines the constitutional relationship between Congress and the President regarding the public lands.6 1
Under article IV, Congress possesses the powers of ownership62 and is
therefore treated as the "principal. 6 a3 The President, however, as a
result of various express and implied delegations of authority, is the
"agent in charge" of the public lands.6 In Midwest Oil, the Court
reasoned that since the "agent in charge" had, on numerous prior occasions, withdrawn lands from the operation of property clause legislation with the knowledge of and without objection by its principal,
legislative power over the public domain, but it also exercises the powers of the proprietor therein." Id.
(quoting Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119, 126 (1905)).
59. After referring to an earlier decision, Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1890), in which the
Court found that an implied license to graze cattle on the public lands had resulted from the practicing
of such for many years without objection by Congress, the Court noted further that if "private persons
could acquire a privilege in public land by virtue of an implied congressional consent, then for a much
stronger reason, an implied grant of power [to the President] to preserve the public interest would arise
out of like congressional acquiescence." 236 U.S. at 475.
The Court emphasized several times that Congress was aware of the presidential practice of such
withdrawals and had never objected prior to the order at issue. Id. at 475, 479, 480, 481. Congress
subsequently enacted legislation which expressly authorized such withdrawals but required a report of
such action to be filed with Congress. Id. at 481-83.
60. 236 U.S. at 470-71, 474-75. Justice Day, dissenting in Midwest Oil, certainly perceived the
withdrawal to be in conflict with the earlier statute. Id. at 492, 504 (Day, J., dissenting). The majority,
however, perceived the statute, which opened the public lands to oil exploration and development, to be
general in nature. Id. at 474. Even though the statute's purpose apparently conflicted directly with the
effect of the President's withdrawal, the majority concluded the statute did not preclude the President
from making specific withdrawals of land from its operation when the public interest so required. Id.
61. Id. at 474-75.
62. Id. See also Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119 (1905), in which the Court described
the congressional powers over the public lands as follows:
The Nation is an owner, and has made Congress the principal agent to dispose of its property. . . . While the disposition of these lands is provided for by Congressional legislation,
such legislation savors somewhat of mere rules prescribed by an owner of property for its
disposal. It is not of a legislative character in the highest sense of the term. ...
Id. at 126.
63. 236 U.S. at 475.
64. Id. at 474, 475, 482. Other "agents" have also received congressional delegations of power
over the public lands. See Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. at 126 ("as an owner may delegate
to his principal agent the right to employ subordinates, giving to them a limited discretion, so it would
seem that Congress might rightfully entrust to the local legislature the determination of minor matters
respecting the disposal of these lands.").
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Congress, that acquiescence must be regarded as an implied ratification of the past withdrawals and authorization of similar future actions. 65 The President's action, therefore, must be valid.
The constitutionality of the President's withdrawal of the lands in
Midwest Oil, therefore, was explicitly analyzed in terms of private
agency law.6 6 That approach is the result of the Court's adherence to
the principle that article IV vests in Congress, not only governmental

powers but all the powers of property ownership as well. 67 That principle is a fundamental theme in public land law which, by the twentieth century, had been firmly entrenched in Supreme Court case law

involving other property clause issues. 68 The application of private
agency law in Midwest Oil was merely an extension of this fundamental principle to the issue of separation of powers. The result, however,
is an exceedingly lenient view of the executive's power over the public
lands in the face of the clear designation of Congress as the manager of
69
those lands in article IV.
The lenience of the Court's approach in Midwest Oil is all the
more remarkable when one considers that at the time the case was
decided issues of separation of powers in other contexts were treated
noticeably more strictly.7 ° The Court in 1914 had not progressed very
65. 236 U.S. at 475.
66. The Court's summary of its conclusion is indicative of this approach.
The Executive, as agent, was in charge of the public domain; by a multitude of orders extending over a long period of time and affecting vast bodies of land, in many States and
Territories, he withdrew large areas in the public interest. These orders were known to Congress, as principal, and in not a single instance was the act of the agent disapproved. Its
acquiescence all the more readily operated as an implied grant of power in view of the fact
that its exercise was not only useful to the public but did not interfere with any vested right of
the citizen. 236 U.S. at 475 (emphasis added).
67. 236 U.S. at 474-75.
68. The Court has relied upon this principle to uphold a broad range of exercises of the property
clause power. Such exercises include disposing of the public lands, United States v. City and County of
San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940); Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92, 99 (1872); United
States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 537 (1840); regulating the use of the public lands, United States
v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) (grazing); United States v. Briggs, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 351 (1850) (logging), and protecting the public lands from harm, Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928) (killing
deer over-browsing the public lands); United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 (1927) (prohibiting careless
use of fire near public lands).
For a discussion of the various categories of use of the property clause power and the possible
limits upon them, see Engdahl, infra note 109 at 358-69; Gaetke, Congressional Discretion Under the
Property Clause, supra note 9; Shepard, The Scope of Congress' ConstitutionalPower Under the Property
Clause: Regulating Non-Federal Property to Further the Purpose of National Parks and Wilderness
Areas, II ENVTL. AFF. 479 (1984).
69. Not only may Congress broadly delegate its authority over the public lands by express legislation; under Midwest Oil, a delegation of power to the President under the property clause that is implied
by mere Congressional silence may be read so expansively as to permit the President to negate the effect
of express legislation.
70. See Glicksman, supra note 8, at 62.
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far from its restrictive view regarding delegation of powers, prevalent
in the late nineteenth century, that such delegation was generally inappropriate 71 and toward its more liberal view of the 1940s and subsequently, that such delegation is a necessary and acceptable fact of
modem government. 72 At the time Midwest Oil was decided, the
Court was willing to uphold delegations by Congress which left to the
President only the power "to ascertain and declare the event upon
which its expressed will was to take effect" 7 3 and delegations which
'74
merely left to the executive the "power to fill up the details."
The Court's separation of powers approach in Midwest Oil, however, is dramatically different. Certainly the Court's private agency
law analysis permitted delegations to the President which were of the
kinds generally approved at the time. Additionally, however, that approach authorized broad, standardless, express delegations to the
President of the expansive authority to determine which public lands
should be excluded from the operation of public lands statutes. 75 Furthermore, the Midwest Oil approach expressly upheld a similarly
broad, but implicit, delegation to the President arising out of the mere
silence of Congress. 76 The only possible explanation for the distinctive
treatment of delegations under the property clause is the peculiar proprietary quality of such legislation.7 7
The Court's view of the proprietary nature of property clause legislation in Midwest Oil is critical when speculating as to the application of Chadha to legislative vetoes in the public lands context. The
Court in Chadha expressly stated its focus to be the determination of
the "legislative" quality of the action constituted by the legislative
veto.7 8 In Midwest Oil, the Court expressly found that property clause
legislation was of a fundamentally different quality than traditional ar71. See, e.g., Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. (13 Otto) 168, 190.92 (1880).
72. See, e.g., Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940). See also I K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.15 at 150-51 (1958). For a brief historical discussion of
the progressively more lenient view of the Court on the question of delegation, see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 2.10 (3d ed. 1972).
73. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692-94 (1892).
74. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911).
75. The Pickett Act is an example of such an express delegation. It provided:
The President may, at any time in his discretion, temporarily withdraw from settlement, location, sale, or entry any of the public lands of the United States, including the District of
Alaska, and reserve the same for water-power sites, irrigation, classification of lands, or other
public purposes to be specified in the orders of withdrawals, and such withdrawals or reservations shall remain in force until revoked by him or by an Act of Congress.
Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 421, § 1, 36 Stat. 847, repealed by Federal Land Policy and Management Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-576 § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2792 (1976) (emphasis added).
76. See supra notes 60, 65-67, and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 57-70, and accompanying text.
78. 103 S. Ct. at 2784.
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ticle I legislation. 79 The Midwest Oil opinion suggests two conclusions
about property clause legislation relevant to the property clause applications of Chadha. First, as to the character of property clause legisla-

tion, the Court found such legislation merely to be an ordering of the
relationship between Congress as "principal" and the President as
"agent in charge" of the public lands.8 0 Second, the Court noted that
the effect of such legislation is generally not viewed as injurious to
legitimate private or public interests.8"
These conclusions may well indicate that the purpose and effect,
and thus the "legislative" quality, of legislative vetoes in the property
clause context may be distinguishable from the purpose and effect of
the legislative veto at issue in Chadha. 2 In Chadha, the Court placed
79. 236 U.S. at 474 (citing Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 126 (1905)). For the Court's
description of property clause legislation as being "not of a legislative quality in the highest sense of the
term," in Butte City Water Co., see supra note 62. The Court in Midwest Oil, of course, only addressed
the quality of property clause legislation for purposes of the separation of powers issue before it. Care

must be taken in transposing the Court's private agency law analysis to other constitutional questions
suggested by the property clause. Some scholars, for example, have maintained that property clause
legislation is without preemptive effect due to the Court's characterization of such legislation in other
contexts as proprietary in nature. See, e.g., Engdahl, infra note 109 at 303-04, 309-10. For a listing of

other authorities so contending, see Gaetke, Refuting the "Classic" Property Clause Theory, supra note
9, at 620 nn. 13-15. This author has argued elsewhere, on the other hand, that property clause legislation is not of lesser quality for purposes of questions of federalism and preemption. See Gaetke, Refuting the "Classic" Property Clause Theory, supra note 9; Gaetke, CongressionalDiscretion Under the
Property Clause, supra note 9.
80. 236 U.S. at 474-75.
81. Id. at 471, 475.
82. The assertion that property clause legislative vetoes, because of their proprietary quality,
might warrant different constitutional treatment than the provision invalidated in Chadha has been
raised in at least two cases. Both involved that provision of the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of 1976 which authorizes a committee of Congress to order the emergency withdrawal of certain
public lands from the operation of public lands legislation by mere resolution. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e)
(1982).
In Pacific Legal Foundation v. Watt, 529 F. Supp. 982 (D.Mont. 1981), modified, 539 F. Supp.
1194 (D.Mont. 1982), decided prior to the Court's decision in Chadha, the plaintiffs challenged a withdrawal order of the Secretary of Interior made in response to the declaration of such an emergency by
the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. 529 F. Supp. at 985. One contention of the
plaintiffs was that the statutory provision violated the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and
presentment. Id. The court read the provision narrowly so as to avoid the constitutional issue. Id. at
1004, 1005; 539 F. Supp. at 1198-99. In dictum, however, the court opined that § 1714(e) was unconstitutional as violative of the requirements of bicameralism and presentment if it permitted the congressional committee to order withdrawal by the Secretary and to determine the duration of that
withdrawal. 529 F. Supp. at 1004, 539 F. Supp. at 1198-99.
In National Wildlife Federation v. Watt, 571 F. Supp. 1145 (D.D.C. 1983), the same statutory
provision was at issue. There the Secretary of Interior had failed to withdraw certain lands from the
mineral leasing laws when ordered to do so by the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
under § 1714(e). Id. at 1147. The plaintiffs challenged the refusal as unlawful, but the Secretary defended on the ground that the provision was unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's decision in
Chadha. Id. at 1147, 1154. In passing upon the likelihood of the plaintiffs prevailing on the merits for
purposes of their preliminary injunction motion, the court expressed the opinion that § 1714(e) was
distinguishable from the legislative veto provision invalidated in Chadha because of its proprietary
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considerable importance upon the effect of the legislative veto on persons outside of the legislative branch, including Chadha himself and
members of the executive branch.8 3 This effect largely demonstrated
to the Court the "legislative" quality of Congress's action vetoing the
Attorney General's decision to suspend the deportation of Chadha.84
character. Id. at 1156-57. The court found as well, however, that a duly promulgated regulation of the
Department of Interior required the Secretary to withdraw the lands when ordered to do so by the
proper congressional committee. Id. at 1147. In the court's opinion that regulation, regardless of the
constitutionality of § 1714(e), required the Secretary to so withdraw the lands. Id. at 1156-57. The
preliminary injunction was thus granted. Id. at 1159. The court's subsequent holding for the plaintiffs
on the merits was based on this non-constitutional conclusion. National Wildlife Federation v. Clark,
577 F. Supp. 825, 827-28 (D.D.C. 1984). For further discussion of these cases, see Glicksman, supra
note 8, at 45-51.
The court's suggestion in National Wildlife Federation v. Watt that § 1714(e) is constitutional
under Chadha because it is a property clause provision is criticized in Goplerud, Federal Coal Leasing
and Partisan Politics: Alternatives and the Shadow of Chadha, 86 W. VA. L. REV. 773, at 792-93
(1984). Professor Goplerud, however, concludes that all property clause legislation is primarily governmental rather than proprietary. Id. at 793. Certainly that is true for some property clause legislation.
See text accompanying notes 111-15 infra. It is clearly not true, however, for all such legislation. Id. It
is possible to categorize property clause legislation as either proprietary or governmental in nature. See
text accompanying notes 108-15 infra. Thus Professor Goplerud's rejection of the distinction between
property clause legislative vetoes and the provision invalidated in Chadha appears unnecessarily broad.
In a fine work on the legislative veto, Professor Watson makes short work of the contention that
property clause legislative vetoes might be treated more leniently than that in Chadha. See Watson,
supra note 2, at 993-95. Professor Watson notes that in United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1946),
the Court concluded that a joint resolution by Congress, vetoed by the President, granted no title to
certain off-shore lands to the State of California despite its clear property clause origin. In so concluding, the Court stated that "the resolution does not represent an exercise of the constitutional power of
Congress to dispose of public property under Article IV, § 3, C12." Id. at 28. Professor Watson infers
from this statement that Congress may effectuate its property clause powers only through article I
legislation. Watson, supra note 2, at 993-95.
That inference, however, may not be justified. The question to which the Court's statement was
addressed was the authority of the Attorney General to maintain the action against the State of California. 332 U.S. at 26. The state argued that the joint resolution purportedly granting title of the lands to
the state reversed earlier statutes which expressly granted the Attorney General broad authority to
institute legal proceedings to protect national interest. Id. at 27. To this extent, therefore, the state was
asserting that an exercise of the proprietary powers of Congress could, by implication, override article I
enactments of Congress. Such an assertion, however, is far broader than a contention that Congress, in
its capacity as a proprietor, may order its relationship with the executive regarding the public lands so
as to permit legislative review via devices other than traditional article I legislation. Furthermore, since
Congress had acted in United States v. California by joint rather than concurrent resolution, 332 U.S.
at 28, it was intended by that body that the President should be able to exercise his veto power regarding the matter. See Martin, supra note 2, at 256 n.8. Thus it is understandable that the Court viewed
the vetoed resolution as not legally binding. See National Wildlife Federation v. Watt, 571 F. Supp.
1145, 1157 (D.D.C. 1983). For further discussion of United States v. California, see Glicksman, supra
note 8, at 53-57.
83. 103 S. Ct. at 2784-85. The Court's analytical starting point in Chadha is a presumption that
any congressional action is legislative because that is the power delegated by the Constitution to that
Branch. Id. at 2784. That presumption would, of course, also apply to property clause legislative
vetoes. The Court's further look at the character and effect of the action constituted by the legislative
veto, however, suggests that the presumption might be overcome by evidence that a legislative veto in
another context is not "legislative" in nature.
84. Id. at 2784.
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The private agency law analysis of Midwest Oil, however, suggests that
in the context of property clause legislation, retention of legislative
veto power might be regarded as less "legislative" in nature than the
veto in Chadha. Although members of the executive branch would be
affected by such a legislative veto to the extent that it overturned some
prior action taken or decision made by them in regard to the public
lands, such an effect would be the result of Congress acting only in its
proprietary rather than in its governmental or legislative capacity.
That is, such a legislative veto would be an exercise of the ownership
powers of Congress, as a principal disaffirming the action taken by the
executive as its agent.
Furthermore, while such a legislative veto might also affect private parties in a practical sense, 85 under the Midwest Oil analysis their
complaints would typically be unjustified since they would have no
legitimate and protectible right or interest.86 In fact, the effect upon
private parties would in most situations be indistinguishable from the
mere disappointment resulting from any private seller's disaffirmance
of an agent's conditional agreement to sell.87
The Court in Chadha also emphasized that the legislative veto
under review was "legislative" in quality because it attempted to alter
the discretion of the Attorney General. 8 Since that discretion, the
Court reasoned, could only be delegated by legislation that followed
the procedural requirements of article I, it could only be altered by
such legislation. 9 Midwest Oil, however, recognized that discretion
regarding the public lands may indeed be delegated to the executive
85. For example, a prospective purchaser of certain public lands under the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976 might see the Secretary of Interior's decision to sell overturned by the
legislative veto provision of 43 U.S.C. § 1713(c) (1982).
86. 236 U.S. at 471, 475. The Court noted:
And in making such (withdrawal) orders, which were thus useful to the public, no private
interest was injured. For prior to the initiation of some right given by law the citizen had no
enforceable interest in the public statute and no private right in land which was the property
of the people. The President was in a position to know when the public interest required
particular portions of the people's lands to be withdrawn from entry or location; his action
inflicted no wrong upon any private citizen, and being subject to disaffirmance by Congress,
could occasion no harm to the interest of the public at large.
Id. at 471.
87. That is, in a private sale of real property, if an owner has delegated authority to an agent to
make a sale conditional upon the owner's subsequent approval, the failure to obtain that approval will
necessarily affect the interests of the purchaser. At a minimum, one would expect disappointment on
the part of the purchaser. However, the disappointed buyer would have no right of action against the
seller since the sale was conditional. A legislative veto in a public lands statute, such as that found in
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1713(c) (1982), which serves as a
mechanism for the expression of disapproval of an Executive proposal to sell certain public lands,
would seem to have the same, but no greater, effect.
88. 103 S. Ct. at 2785-86.
89. Id.
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branch by means other than traditional legislation. Because of the
proprietary nature of the property clause power, such discretion may
be delegated by implication from mere congressional inaction, 90 certainly a form of congressional expression not complying with the procedural requirements of article I. Under this analysis presumably the
proprietary powers of Congress would permit delegated discretion
under the property clause to be altered or restricted by congressional
means other than traditional legislation as well.9 1
What is crucial to the application of Chadha to legislative vetoes
in the public lands context is the Court's view of the proprietary nature of legislation under the property clause. In Midwest Oil this view
is the critical factor in defining the constitutional relationship between
Congress and the President pertaining to the control of article IV
lands.9 2 Additionally, however, this view permeates other aspects of
public land law and has done so throughout our constitutional history.9 3 Any review of the constitutionality of legislative vetoes in the
public lands context must be done in the light of this consistent and
long-standing view regarding the unique character and effect of property clause enactments. An extension of Chadha to prohibit such
property clause legislative vetoes would appear to require the rejection
not only of a regular congressional practice94 but of a well-settled tenet
of public land law as well. 95
III.

PROPERTY CLAUSE LEGISLATIVE VETOES AND THE
CONCERNS OF CHADHA

In Chadha the Court approached the separation of powers issue
by directing its inquiry at the requirements of bicameral passage and
presentment to the President.96 The purposes to be served by those
requirements, however, when considered in light of the Court's view of
property clause legislation in Midwest Oil are not advanced by a broad
90. 236 U.S. at 474-75.
91. Not all property clause enactments, however, are within the powers of private proprietors.
See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
92. 236 U.S. at 474-75.
93. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
94. The Court invalidated the use of the legislative veto in Chadha despite the device's long history of acceptability before Congress. See 103 S. Ct. at 2793-96 (White, J., dissenting). The regular use
of the legislative veto in property clause legislation, therefore, would not by itself suggest any different
constitutional treatment of such legislative vetoes. For a discussion of the extent of utilization of the
legislative veto in public lands legislation, see supra notes 10, II.
95. One scholar has reviewed the legislative veto provisions of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1783, and has found them constitutionally objectionable under
Chadha. Glicksman, supra note 8, at 35-51.
96. See 103 S. Ct. at 2781-84, 2787.

1985]

LEGISLATIVE VETOES AND THE PUBLIC LANDS

575

ban on legislative vetoes in the public lands context. 97 In fact, the
underlying purposes of these requirements suggest that such legislative

vetoes should generally be excluded from the reach of Chadha.
The Court perceived two primary reasons for the inclusion of the
presentment requirement in the Constitution. First, presentment of
legislation for possible veto permits the President to protect against

legislative infringement upon the prerogatives of the Executive
Branch.9 Second, presentment provides a check against unwise action by the legislature. 99

The bicameralism requirement, on the other hand, was intended
to ensure careful deliberation on legislative matters." ° By necessitating separate legislative proceedings and majority assent by two distinct, separately elected bodies, the requirement works as a check
against emotional, impatient, and ill-considered actions which might
be expected from a single legislative body."° '
In terms of these requirements, however, property clause legisla-

tion can be distinguished from other types of legislation because of its
peculiar proprietary character."0 2 The Court's extension of this concept of ownership to the separation of powers context in Midwest Oil
suggests that at least some legislative vetoes within property clause
legislation might also be viewed as merely proprietary acts. Thus,
Congress in reserving a legislative veto power in a property clause statute would be virtually identical to a private proprietor defining the
terms of another party's agency status with regard to the owner's
property. That is, the enactment of property clause legislation vesting
discretion in the President as Congress's "agent", would be a conditional grant of authority, the exercise of which would be subject to the
review and potential express disaffirmance by Congress, as "princi97. Justice White, in dissent in Chadha, preferred to use such a functional analysis in reviewing
the validity of the legislative veto provision at issue there rather than the axiomatic approach of the
majority. See 103 S. Ct. at 2798, 2798-99. See also Glicksman, supra note 8, at 29 (the Court failed to
use a functional approach); Spann, Spinning the Legislative Veto, 72 GEO. L.J. 813, 813 (1984) (the
majority opinion's "tone is glib; its reasoning is superficial; and its analysis is linguistic rather than
functional in nature").
98. Id. at 2782.
99. Id. at 2782-83.
100. Id. at 2783-84.
101. Id.
102. For a discussion of this characteristic of property clause legislation, see supra text accompanying notes 57-69. In his thorough discussion of the constitutionality of the legislative veto provisions
of the Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1783, Professor Glicksman
notes the proprietary nature of much property clause legislation, Glicksman, supra note 8, at 59-63, but
concludes that the purposes served by the requirements of bicameralism and presentment are also applicable to property clause legislative vetoes. Id. at 63-64. His work does not address in any detail,
however, the separation of powers implications arising from Midwest Oil and their relevance to the
application of Chadha to such legislative vetoes.
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pal," through exercise of the retained legislative veto power.103
When property clause legislative vetoes are viewed in this way,
the concerns addressed by the constitutional requirement of presentment seem inapposite. The fear of legislative encroachment upon the
power of the Executive Branch is particularly inapplicable. According
to the Court's opinion in Midwest Oil, the President's powers over the
public lands are generally merely proprietary10 4 and are derived, either
expressly or by implication, from the action or inaction of Congress.
Thus, a typical legislative veto in the public lands context would
merely result in congressional correction of an exercise of proprietary
discretion previously conditionally vested in the President. Since the
proprietary power of the President is derivative only, there would be
no infringement upon his article II powers."
The further purpose of the presentment requirement, to provide a
check upon unwise legislative action, also seems peculiarly ill suited to
property clause legislative vetoes if the constitutional relationship between the President and Congress is defined by the principles of private agency law. That is, if the President is deemed to be merely the
"agent in charge" of the public lands, deriving his proprietary authority only by the express and implicit dictates of Congress, it would be
incongruous to assert that Congress as principal must have the consent of that agent before it can overturn objectionable discretionary
actions of the agent. The requirement of presentment in the public
lands context would thus permit the agent to check the wisdom of the
principal's wishes, which would directly conflict with the private
agency law approach of Midwest Oil.
On the other hand, the purpose underlying the bicameralism requirement, to ensure careful deliberation of legislative nature, appears
more consistent with the peculiar proprietary aspects of property
clause legislation. That is, to the extent that bicameral passage protects the public from hasty and ill-considered legislative acts in general, it would have the same effect in the public lands context. One
might conclude, therefore, that the bicameralism requirement would
prohibit the exercise of property clause legislative vetoes except
103. For examples of property clause legislative vetoes which appear to comport with this description, see, 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(4)(A) (1982) (review of Executive's bidding system for sale of offshore oil and gas leases); 43 U.S.C. § 1354(c) (1982) (review of Executive's decision to export federally
owned oil and gas); 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(1) (1982) (review of Executive's withdrawal of certain public
lands from the operation of public lands legislation).
104. Some property clause powers delegated by Congress to the President may not be merely
proprietary. For further discussion of this issue, see infra text accompanying notes 108-16.
105. But see infra text accompanying notes 113-16 for the proposition that some property clause
legislative vetoes might, nonetheless, infringe upon the article II powers of the President.

1985]

LEGISLATIVE VETOES AND THE PUBLIC LANDS

577

through majority passage by both Houses.106
Even bicameralism, however, might be subject to more lenient
treatment, given the Court's proprietary view of property clause matters in Midwest Oil. If the property clause gives Congress the discre-

tionary powers of a private proprietor, one might speculate that
Congress possesses the power to delegate some or all of that authority
to a sub-portion of itself. That is, a legislative veto power being

granted to a single House or, indeed, to a committee of a single House,
would appear to be within the permissible scope of conduct of a principal under private agency law and, therefore, within the property
clause authority of Congress under Midwest Oil."°7 Such a legislative
veto would merely be another form of structuring the agency relationship between Congress and the President that would be acceptable for
a private proprietor under general agency principles.

IV. A

SUGGESTED LIMITATION

It appears that a plausible argument can be constructed to distinguish property clause legislative vetoes from the provision found unconstitutional in Chadha. But a finer line may need to be drawn. The
property clause powers of Congress include both those of disposal of
the public lands and of regulation of conduct pertaining to their use. 108
In disposing of the public lands Congress is perceived to have all of the

powers of any private proprietor.' 0 9 Therefore, the private agency law
approach of Midwest Oil seems quite applicable to legislative vetoes
contained in legislation directed toward that disposal."o
106. A concurrent resolution, for example, might be constitutionally permissible. This type of
resolution is frequently employed as the mechanism of congressional disaffirmance in the legislative
veto provisions of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1712(e),
1713(c), 1714(c)(l), 1714(l)(1) (1982). But see United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947) (joint
resolution of Congress vetoed by the President, held, not a valid exercise of property clause power).
This case is discussed further at supra note 82.
107. An example of a public lands statute utilizing a one-House legislative veto provision is the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1982). See 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(4)(A)
(1982).
An example of a public lands statute containing a legislative veto power exercisable by a mere
committee of Congress is the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1571-1599
(1982). See 43 U.S.C. § 1598(a) (1982).
108. The clause empowers Congress both "to dispose of" the public lands and to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting" them. U.S. CONST. art.IV, § 3, cl. 2.
109. See supra note 68. For further discussion of the breadth of the dispositional power of Congress over the public lands, see Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18 ARIz. L.
REV. 283, 362-70 (1976); Gaetke, CongressionalDiscretion Under the Property Clause, supra note 9, at
384-86, 391-93.
110. In fact, it was the property clause dispositional power of Congress which was delegated by
congressional silence in Midwest Oil. See 236 U.S. at 469-72.
Numerous public lands legislative vetoes are exercises of the dispositional power of Congress. See,
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The regulatory power of Congress under the property clause,
however, is more expansive than the power of disposal. As might be
expected, it includes all the power necessary to regulate the use of
property that is inherent in private ownership." I Legislative vetoes in
such regulatory legislation can be analogized to a private proprietor's
arrangement with its agent regarding the principal's affirmance or disaffirmance of the agent's regulation of the use of the principal's property.' 1 2 Such an arrangement would be entirely consistent with the
principles of agency articulated in Midwest Oil.
Congress's property clause regulatory power, however, also extends beyond the regulatory powers possessed by private proprietors.
It also encompasses authority that is governmental in nature and not
attributable to mere ownership." 3 Unlike a private proprietor, Congress may, for example, permit to occur on the public lands conduct
prohibited by state law." 4 Additionally, Congress may utilize its
property clause regulatory power to control conduct acceptable under
state law occurring outside the physical boundaries of federal lands."'
Regulatory legislation under the property clause that exceeds the restrictions that a private proprietor may lawfully impose upon the use
of his or her property appears indistinguishable from traditional artie.g. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1353(a), (d), 1354(c) (1982) (review of sale of federally owned oil and gas); 43 U.S.C.
§ 1713(c) (1982) (review of Executive's decision to sell certain public lands); 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(1)
(1982) (review of Executive's withdrawal of lands from operation of public lands legislation); 43 U.S.C.
§ 1722(b) (1982) (review of Executive's decision not to sell certain public lands).
I l1. Like any property owner, for example, Congress may regulate conduct on the public lands
which it perceives to be harmful to those lands. See, e.g., McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 359
(1922). Similarly, Congress may designate a particular use of the public lands and prohibit any conduct
which conflicts with that designated use. For example, Congress, as a mere proprietor, has established
the national parks, wilderness areas and wildlife refuges. See, e.g., Yellowstone National Park Establishment Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 21-43 (1982); Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 131-36 (1982); National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (1982).
112. For example, Congress might statutorily empower the Secretary of the Interior to determine
when hunting should be permitted on certain public lands but require such determinations to be forwarded to Congress for possible legislative veto. Such an arrangement would seem well within the
power of a private proprietor to designate an agent to make such decisions while reserving an express
mechanism for the review and possible disaffirmance of them.
113. For further discussion of this governmental regulatory power under the property clause, see
Gaetke, Congressional Discretion Under the Property Clause, supra note 9, at 386-95; Gaetke, The
Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of) 978: Regulating Nonfederal Property Under the Property Clause, supra note 9, at 166-74.
114. See, e.g., Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928) (federally authorized deer hunting on
federal lands despite prohibition by state law).
115. See The Unlawful Inclosures of Public Lands Act of 1885, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061-1066 (1982)
(prohibition of the construction of fences on private property where they would hamper access to public
lands); The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982) (prohibition
against the taking of wild horses and burros anywhere, whether on or off the public lands); The Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 94-495, 92 Stat. 1649 (1978) (prohibition
against the use of motorboats on state-owned waters within certain public lands).
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cle I legislation. It is governmental rather than proprietary action and
is, therefore "legislative" in its character and effect. Since this type of
legislation lacks the proprietary quality inherent in other property
clause matters, the analogy to private agency law relied upon to resolve the separation of powers issue in Midwest Oil seems inapplicable.
As a result, any legislative veto power retained in such legislation
would seem indistinguishable from the veto power held unconstitutional in Chadha.
The approach to the separation of powers issue in Midwest Oil
suggests that Chadha should not be extended to invalidate the use of
legislative vetoes in property clause legislation, except where Congress
is acting in its governmental rather than proprietary role in respect to
the public lands. Whether the Court chooses to agree depends upon
the current vitality of the rationale underlying Midwest Oil, about
which we may only speculate. The critical issue is whether the Court
will continue to adhere to its long-standing position that the property
clause grants to Congress all of the powers of a private proprietor as
well as governmental powers. In other property clause contexts the
Court appears committed to this historical principle."1 6 Using the rationale of Chadha to invalidate property clause legislative vetoes,
would constitute a break with that commitment.
V.

CONCLUSION

It would appear that the correlative roles of Congress and the
President regarding the public lands are unique among the powers distributed by the Constitution. They are defined, so far as Supreme
Court case law goes, in terms of private property and agency law
rather than in terms more common to separation of powers issues.
These principles may well suggest that legislative vetoes contained in
much property clause legislation warrant different constitutional treatment than that accorded the article I legislative veto power reviewed
and found unconstitutional in Chadha. Most property clause enactments, being merely proprietary in nature, differ in quality from traditional legislation. They regulate the agency relationship of the
President and Congress but do not affect the rights of persons outside
the government. Furthermore, the concerns underlying presentment
and bicameralism, as expressed in Chadha, would not be served by a
broad ban on legislative vetoes in the public lands context. In fact,
those article I procedural requirements appear in direct contradiction
116. In its most recent pronouncement regarding the extent of the property clause power, the
Supreme Court adhered to its conviction that such power is "without limitations." Kleppe v. New
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976).

580

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

to the private property and agency law approach to separation of powers issues in the public lands context. At a minimum, therefore, when
Congress is exercising its property clause power in a manner consistent with the powers of a private proprietor, the use of a legislative
veto appears constitutionally distinguishable from the veto power invalidated in Chadha.

